

BLUEPRINT FOR THE USN

1976 - 2000

I

In recent months there has been considerable debate in both the Executive and Legislative branches on how best to spend the most generous allowance of monies for shipbuilding which the Congress has appropriated since World War II. The fact that there was so much debate has underscored the uncertainty in government as to what the U.S. Navy will be expected to do in coming decades. This paper briefly examines the major considerations in predicting the future role of the navy and suggests a shipbuilding program which will ensure that the Navy's role can be fulfilled.

Two factors are predominant in determining those tasks which the Navy may be called upon to perform and which it will be capable of performing:

- (1) The politico-military environment in which the United States and her allies must function, and
- (2) the technological advances which inexorably alter the conduct of warfare.

II

Politico-Military Environment

The first characteristic of the politico-military environment is strategic nuclear balance. Naval contributions to U.S. strategic nuclear forces will continue to demand the highest priority. Since the naval strategic program is a part of a tri-service force, limited by international agreement, and customarily considered separately from other naval shipbuilding programs, it will not be considered in detail in this paper.

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The second political imperative is to maintain the traditional close relationship between the United States and Western Europe. Militarily, the defense of Western Europe must rank next among the United States' concerns. While most thinking on the Navy's role in Europe foresees a continued need for both naval projection of power ashore and for sea control, it is popularly contended that sea control would not be important in a NATO conflict because any war with the Soviets in Europe would be short and therefore resupply unnecessary. We must recall with concern that a short war was also predicted in both 1914 and 1939. Those contentions were wrong. However, even in a short war, some critical goods must start flowing very early, particularly if inadequate war supplies are stockpiled as is the case today in Europe. In any major NATO conflict, sea control requirements would dominate those of projection, also because neither naval tactical air nor amphibious projection figure prominently in NATO's concept for the defense of Europe. Unless it is perceived that the U.S. Navy continues to be capable of waging an effective sea control campaign in a long war against growing Soviet naval strength, our allies may understandably question the credibility of our capability to support them. Even worse, the Soviet Union might perceive the naval balance as being sufficiently in their favor to permit them to risk testing us at sea.

In sum, for support of NATO and Europe, the U.S. Navy must be prepared

- ° To employ such projection assets as it has, but not necessarily to program specifically for that purpose;

- To conduct successful sea control operations by direct support of naval forces and limited convoys in a short war;
- To conduct successful sustained sea control operations in a long war by means of both direct support of specific resupply and reinforcement shipping and by progressive attrition operations to wear down the overall enemy threat over time.
- To foster the perception that we possess the capability to achieve a requisite level of sea control over both the long and short term.

A third demand of the political environment will be to safeguard United State's interests in parts of the world outside Europe. The probability that the United States will need to use military force in support of foreign policy is increasing, particularly in the developing nations. In many newly independent nations, the rapidly evolving national political structure and growing economic aspirations often lack adequate economic underpinnings. In such circumstances, the shift from colonial control to national independence can result in economic and political commitments which in themselves constitute a new form of dependence. Such dependence may seem antithetical to nationalist objectives and can create regional turmoil. When the virtually unique circumstances surrounding each emerging nation's quest for a place in the sun is combined with the heightened potential for interference debouched by OPEC wealth, the current vogue for terrorism, and the activities of new regional pressure blocs in the United Nations, being ready to support our foreign interests militarily appears prudent. Such interests include:

- Ensuring access to raw materials,
- Protecting special interests in Central and South America,
- Preventing regional power balance disturbances in areas like the Middle East and Asia from upsetting the global balance of power.

- ° Supporting concerns for human rights, democracy, freedom of seas, suppression of terrorism, etc.
- ✓° Protecting our economic activities on the high seas.

In addition, in considering the politico-military environment in the non-European world, we can not overlook the evidence of Soviet ambition to wield global influence. In fact the Soviet economic base is inadequate to this aspiration, as is its diplomatic competence, e.g., Soviet setback in Egypt. However, the Soviets are not going to be denied a global military capability through their expanding military airlift capacity, merchant marine and naval forces. It will be in our interests to be prepared to manage this military component of Soviet global policy. Not to do so, and it is much more within our capability than theirs to wield global military power, would simply assist their overcoming their economic and diplomatic weaknesses to our detriment. Moreover, while our defense posture in Europe is of higher consequence to us than that anywhere else, the probability of the Soviets initiating military hostilities against NATO are low. Their estimate of our readiness to respond elsewhere will be a major determinant of how aggressively they act, with consequent danger of our being forced into an unwanted confrontation.

To support its non-European interests, the United States must be able to move power quickly to areas of concern. If both superpowers become directly involved in the same political event, the first to arrive on the scene with military force may preclude the other from bringing force to bear lest there be a direct confrontation over an issue that is less than vital to either. For instance, if the Lebanon crisis of 1958 were re-enacted today, whichever went ashore first, the

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### III

#### Technological Trends

The major technological issue in the sea control task is whether the vulnerability of surface ships decreases by having large numbers of smaller, less capable, less expensive ships or small numbers of larger, very capable, expensive ships. Two fundamental facts incline the argument toward larger numbers of modestly capable ships. First, a ship's ability to defend itself does not generally improve in proportion to increasing size and cost. There are exceptions, of course, where a specific capability which can be incorporated in a larger ship could

not have been physically accommodated in a smaller one. However, many technological trends are making this kind of limitation less likely because greater miniaturization of equipment, particularly when combined with greater individual weapon accuracy, permits ships to be smaller, lighter, and cheaper. One exception is the technology of nuclear power. The fact that nuclear power technology has not decreased in cost demands that this highly desirable form of naval propulsion be carefully weighed against the number of conventionally powered units which could be bought with the same money.

Second, developments like Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), nuclear-powered submarines, anti-ship missiles, and satellites tend to favor the sea denial role more than the sea control role. A sea control war of attrition will entail losses for which only replacements will restore the balance. If nuclear weapons are employed at sea, sea denial forces would have an even greater advantage in their favor and the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea is becoming more rather than less probable. The increase in the probability that a single weapon will kill because it is nuclear, or even precision-guided, tends to make a "surgical" strike more easily possible. This, in turn, lowers the threshold at which such a weapon will be used. The larger, the more expensive, the more irreplaceable a ship is, the more it represents a "must" target. If the enemy feels capable of eliminating a large segment of our military prestige and power individually, perhaps to make an isolated foreign policy point, the more he is encouraged to do so by crossing the nuclear threshold in a single, closely contained action -- perhaps at sea only. No single ship can be so important either as a

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fraction of a nation's military strength or as an object of that nation's prestige that it cannot be lost without irreparably damaging either. Today's technology is making numbers more important than ever.

The technological issue for tactical air projection turns on a similar conundrum. Will fewer, less costly platforms (missiles, or Remotely-Piloted Vehicles [RPVs] or lesser performance manned aircraft with Precision Guided Munitions [PGMs]) enable us to meet our future projection needs, or will we still have to depend on large numbers of expensive, high performance, manned aircraft? Technology is tending to the former. Though microelectronics and the miniaturization of immense computational memory power, the capability to control aircraft and weapons is greatly enhanced. This has permitted the development of weapons with very high probabilities of direct hit (Precision Guided Munitions [PGMs]). The more accurate the weapon, the fewer need to be carried, the smaller and fewer the aircraft. If the aircraft can also be remotely controlled with great accuracy, the more missions it can accomplish without a pilot. Naturally there is a large middle ground where it is difficult to determine the degree to which unmanned aircraft will encroach on manned. Missions like armed RECCE will probably require human intelligence in a cockpit for some time to come. And, technological developments seldom have one-sided application. Enhanced computational capability will increase air defense effectiveness making penetration more difficult, ECM/ECCM a greater determinant of success, and the cost of both greater. It may be so difficult for a lesser performance aircraft to penetrate air defenses, that large numbers of higher performance attack aircraft may be required for escort, ECM, defense suppression, air superiority, etc. In such an event, however, we probably would be forced to rely more heavily on technology, turning to less vulnerable and less costly attack systems, e.g. unmanned RPVs and cruise missiles, rather than brute force.



IV

Concept for the U.S. Navy

Taking into consideration the discernable politico-military trends in the European and "other world" arenas and the implications of technology on surface ships and aircraft in the next decade, the following is suggested as a concept for the United States Navy through the end of this century.

With primary emphasis on the defense of Europe, naval assets must first be capable of sea control in direct support of naval forces and immediate resupply shipping. They must withstand the initial preemptive onslaught and then quickly establish a level of sea control wherein they can afford to provide support to forces ashore or protection of resupply shipping within an acceptable level of risk to themselves. This will require high performance carriers (CV's) and escorts to operate in a high air threat environment; anti-submarine aircraft (VP/VS); and submarines, SSN (DS), in direct support. As the war progresses, naval forces must be able to continue direct support operations but also wear down the enemy at sea through sustained attrition sea control operations. CVs, some of lesser capability for operations in the open sea lanes, escorts, VP/VS and SSN(DS) will also be required for both these direct support and attrition operations, plus additional SSNs, SOSUS and mines to establish and maintain attrition barriers. The high level of demand for these assets and the losses which can reasonably be expected in any all out war argue for large numbers.

Contrary to popular logic, extra-European demands on the U.S. Navy are not lesser included cases of the European one, but instead may be additive and of quite a different nature. Certainly sea control will be

necessary if the navy is to be free to operate at all anywhere. The assets required will be similar to those for a European conflict, but with lesser emphasis on high performance carriers since the air threat environment will not be as hostile. These "other world" requirements may call for large numbers of ships if remote areas are to be covered without letting down our guard in Europe at the same time. Often the use of a supercarrier in the other world would represent many magnitudes of overkill and at the same time risk it unnecessarily to danger from the growing strength and ubiquity of coastal missile patrol boats. Small, less capable carriers would convey the same power message to other world nations, could be built in sufficient quantity to cover several trouble spots simultaneously, and when aggregated, could contribute meaningfully to any European scenario. Beyond a basic sea control requirement, it is more likely that projection forces will be needed in conflicts outside of Europe. In most other parts of the world (except for S. Korea) few in-place U.S. ground forces, no equipment stockpiles, and relatively less indigenous military support available calls for large numbers of insertion forces prepared to arrive on the scene quickly. This means having sufficient forces for remote contingency areas in advance of actual requirements. In short, these other world needs place greater requirements for numbers and somewhat lesser emphasis on high capability carriers.

The question then, given continually increasing ship costs, is how to obtain the large number of ships needed. The only reasonable answer seems to come from a very careful look at the capabilities required in the situations just described and the rejection of levels of ship flexibility/capability which exceed those needs. The aircraft carrier,

being the most flexible and consequently the most expensive system the navy owns, is unquestionably the first object for scrutiny. Recent debate has focused on whether to buy more CVNs or to shift to smaller CVs (CVV). The principal threat to naval forces and their ability to establish sea control today is from missiles. Our sensors must reach farther out to detect and our range of weapon response must be greater and quicker. Aircraft are ideal, and in many cases unique, for both purposes. Thus sea based air power is vital to sea control today and growing more so. What choice is there then? At present budget levels, roughly one CVN can be funded every other year or two CVV every year. This would provide a force level increment in 10 years of 5 CVN or 20 CVV added to the 11-12 CV/CVN in the USN's programmed inventory through 2000.

There are several risks with the CVN alternative: (1) With PGM's, etc., CV/CVN's may become so vulnerable that we might be reluctant to commit them except in a big war. We might not want to run the risk of losing them in minor actions and then not have them for a crucial war. This was Great Britain's prudent inhibition in 1935 when considering intervention in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia; (2) There might not be adequate CVNs to cover either prolonged attrition operations in a large scale European and "other world" tasks.

There are risks with the CVV program as well: (1) The CVV carries fewer attack aircraft because of reduced demand in the sea control role; and (2) the CVV can accommodate fewer sophisticated aircraft. The reduced inventory of attack aircraft means that the CVV would be unable to field sufficient projection power for sustained air combat such as we conducted in Vietnam. One consequence of going to the CVV then would be that the USN might turn over sustained projection operations to the Air Force whose mobility has improved. The USN would thereby not need

to prepare for the unacceptable material strain of 8 years sustained combat operations such as in Vietnam, but instead could capitalize on both the CV and CVV's unique potential for early arrival without the need for prepared airfields. In the short run of course a large number of CVV could always be aggregated to provide a greater quantity of power projection.

Another consequence of reduced sophistication would be the risk that the CVV in the projection role could not field aircraft capable of countering modern air defenses even in the Third World or, in the sea control role of countering Soviet missile ships. For the immediate future, these weaknesses are mitigated by the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) which will enable retention of 11-12 CV/CVN's through the year 2000. If each CV/CVN were augmented by one or more CVV each CV/CVN could embark more VA/VF, leaving the ASW function to the CVV - increasing the CVN's attack capability. Further, until the success of VSTOL technology is more evident, two catapults (not necessarily steam) and arresting wires could be put on early CVV's.

The proposed aircraft carrier program, then would be to:

- Hold with 11-12 CV/CVN's and Air Wings.
- Rapidly move into the CVV with a trade off of at least 4:1 for a CVN.
- Continue the accent on VSTOL/RPV technology.
- Hedge VSTOL/RPV bet with catapults/arresting gear on CVV.
- Add to enemy reconnaissance problems and reduce construction costs by proliferating common hull/propulsion for CVV, AD, AS, AO, AE, AF and LX.

An operational concept would provide for:

- ° CVV and CV's employed in presence role with CVN's as the quick reaction "fire brigade".
- ° Employ combination of CV/CVN and VSS for direct support sea control in areas of high air threat and for any projection of tactical air power; elsewhere CVV would assume bulk of sea control role.

Numbers is equally the issue with other surface ships for sea control. Surface ship hull size is not costly, thus a common hull and propulsion system (non-nuclear) should be used for surface combatants like DD's, FF's and CG's. This would provide savings in the commonality of design, production and training, plus the advantages of proliferation. Costs must be brought down if numbers are to go up. In FY-1977, \$6.2B in SCN is buying 15 1/6th new ships; over time this rate of building will sustain a navy of only 330-380 ships, well less than today's navy. It is doubtful that a navy of this size would be adequate either for our attrition sea control requirements in Europe or our presence/reaction requirements in the "Other World."

SSN's are primarily an attrition weapon. Though direct support (escort) is a newer function with great potential, destroyers (DD) with towed arrays are less expensive than submarines and may prove to be as effective in the direct support function. Until the comparative usefulness of SSN (DS) and DD (towed array) is sorted out, the SSN building program should be slowed from the present 3-4 a year to 1 or none. There would be no harm in this for at least 3-4 years, because there is such a backlog of submarines on order already that a hiatus in funding would not impact on actual construction. In addition, we need time to assess what impact the present severe personnel problems in the nuclear submarine program will have on the submarine force level.

The Amphibious Force will find its role primarily in "Other World" requirements where their peacetime presence role could be useful and where smaller scale assaults are most likely. When it becomes necessary to replace amphibious ships, they should share a common hull with the CVV.

Greater numbers of underway replenishment ships will be needed to sustain "Other World" operations, especially as overseas bases decline in number. Like amphibious ships, they should also share a common hull with the CVV.

V

A navy with greater numbers of less sophisticated units combined with extant forces, will permit increased flexibility in deployments, a wider spread of assets, an improvement in response time to world events, and better (i.e. more carefully orchestrated) use of specialized forces like the Marines.

New employment possibilities include:

- ° Utilizing LPH's and LHA's as small CV's to create more deployed carrier task forces to increase naval presence around the world. In most parts of the world, a CVN task force is overkill.
  - ° Increasing the flexibility of amphibious deployments by reducing size of 6th and 7th Fleet deployments, and inter-
- Random  
Surge  
employment* dispersing them with irregular/varied deployments with small task forces to other parts of the world.

- Changing CV balance: 7 in Atlantic (2 deployed), 5 in Pacific (2 deployed) in order to concentrate limited assets where biggest war is most likely and peacetime presence impact is most important.
- Homeport one Atlantic CV in U.K. for ready use in North Atlantic and rapid surge incursions in Mediterranean.
- Average 2 CV's for NATO use, but pulse up to 4-5 with U.K. homeported CV and Atlantic assets, and down to zero with LHA's as temporary substitutes.

The continued interest of the United States in the world around it will increase rather than decrease the need for naval power. This need cannot be met by a few very high quality ships nor by trying to operate with fewer ships but in much the same way we have since World War II. First, to cover the wide geographical range of national interests, there is no substitute for adequate numbers of ships. Adequate numbers do not now exist. Second, those ships must be used imaginatively. Repetition dulls the senses. Stereotype deployments continually convey less and less real meaning. Varied deployments can satisfactorily meet constant national commitments and at the same time respond more sensitively to changing world events. Only when these two requirements are met will the United States Navy be ready to meet the uncertainties of tomorrow.



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## I

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Two factors are predominant in determining those tasks which the Navy may be called upon to perform and which it will be capable of performing:

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Politico-Military Environment

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forces will continue to demand the highest priority. Since the naval strategic program is a part of a tri-service force, limited by international agreement, and customarily considered separately from other naval shipbuilding programs, it will not be considered in detail in this paper.

The second political imperative is to maintain the traditional close relationship between the United States and Western Europe. Militarily, the defense of Western Europe must rank next among the United States' concerns. While most thinking on the Navy's role in Europe foresees a continued need for both naval projection of power ashore and for sea control, it is popularly contended that sea control would not be important in a NATO conflict because any war with the Soviets in Europe would be short and therefore resupply unnecessary. We must recall with concern that a short war was also predicted in both 1914 and 1939. Those contentions were wrong. However, even in a short war, some critical goods must start flowing very early, particularly if inadequate war supplies are stockpiled as is the case today in Europe. In any major NATO conflict, sea control requirements would dominate those of projection, also because neither naval tactical air nor amphibious projection figure prominently in NATO's concept for the defense of Europe. Unless it is perceived that the U.S. Navy continues to be capable of waging an effective sea control campaign in a long war against growing Soviet naval strength, our allies may understandably question the credibility of our capability to support them. Even worse, the Soviet Union might perceive the naval balance as being sufficiently in their favor to permit them to risk testing us at sea.

In sum, for support of NATO and Europe, the U.S. Navy must be prepared

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*This stems from  
1. → 2. → 3. →  
R.R. → eliminate*

A third demand of the political environment will be to safeguard United State's interests in <sup>other</sup> parts of the world <sup>than</sup> outside Europe. The <sup>Challenges to America</sup> probability that the United States will need to use military force in support of foreign policy is increasing, particularly in the developing nations. In many newly independent nations, the rapidly evolving national political structure and growing economic aspirations often lack adequate economic underpinnings. In such circumstances, the shift from colonial control to national independence can result in economic and political commitments which in themselves constitute a new form of dependence. Such dependence may seem antithetical to nationalist objectives and can create regional turmoil. When the virtually unique circumstances surrounding each emerging nation's quest for a place in the sun is combined with the heightened potential for interference debouched by OPEC wealth, the current vogue for terrorism, and the activities of new regional pressure blocs in the United Nations, being ready to support our foreign interests militarily appears prudent. Such interests include:

*(B)  
Too strong  
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acceptability  
mod*

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*Discuss interests  
FIRST  
• then likely challenges to them  
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Second, developments like Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), nuclear-powered submarines, anti-ship missiles, and satellites tend to favor the sea denial role more than the sea control role. A sea control war of attrition will entail losses for which only replacements will restore the balance. If nuclear weapons are employed at sea, sea denial forces would have an even greater advantage in their favor and the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea is becoming more rather than less probable. The increase in the probability that a single weapon will kill because it is nuclear, or even precision-guided, tends to make a "surgical" strike more easily possible. This, in turn, lowers the threshold at which such a weapon will be used. The larger, the more expensive, the more irreplaceable a ship is, the more it represents a "must" target. If the enemy feels capable of eliminating a large segment of our military prestige and power individually, perhaps to make an isolated foreign policy point, the more he is encouraged to do so by crossing the nuclear threshold in a single, closely contained action -- perhaps at sea only. No single ship can be so important either as a

fraction of a nation's military strength or as an object of that nation's prestige that it cannot be lost without irreparably damaging either. Today's technology is making numbers more important than ever.

The technological issue for tactical air projection turns on a similar conundrum. Will fewer, less costly platforms (missiles, or Remotely-Piloted Vehicles [RPVs] or lesser performance manned aircraft with Precision Guided Munitions [PGMs]) enable us to meet our future projection needs, or will we still have to depend on large numbers of expensive, high performance, manned aircraft? Technology is tending to the former. Though microelectronics and the miniaturization of immense computational memory power, the capability to control aircraft and weapons is greatly enhanced. This has permitted the development of weapons with very high probabilities of direct hit (Precision Guided Munitions [PGMs]). The more accurate the weapon, the fewer need to be carried, the smaller and fewer the aircraft. If the aircraft can also be remotely controlled with great accuracy, the more missions it can accomplish without a pilot. Naturally there is a large middle ground where it is difficult to determine the degree to which unmanned aircraft will encroach on manned. Missions like armed RECCE will probably require human intelligence in a cockpit for some time to come. And, technological developments seldom have one-sided application. Enhanced computational capability will increase air defense effectiveness making penetration more difficult, ECM/ECCM a greater determinant of success, and the cost of both greater. It may be so difficult for a lesser performance aircraft to penetrate air defenses, that large numbers of higher performance attack aircraft ~~may~~ <sup>would</sup> be required for escort, ECM, defense suppression, air superiority, etc. In such an event, however, we probably would be forced to rely more heavily on technology, turning to less vulnerable and less costly attack systems, e.g. unmanned RPVs and cruise missiles, rather than brute force.

*I think there  
two thoughts  
contradict, unless  
"would" is  
used.*

IV

Concept for the U.S. Navy

(make stronger) ~~proposed the~~  
~~suggested as a~~ concept for the United States Navy through the end of this century.

With primary emphasis on the defense of Europe, naval assets must first be capable of sea control in direct support of naval forces and immediate resupply shipping. They must withstand the initial preemptive onslaught and then quickly establish a level of sea control wherein they can afford to provide support to forces ashore or protection of resupply shipping within an acceptable level of risk to themselves. This will require high performance carriers (CV's) and escorts to operate in a high air threat environment; anti-submarine aircraft (VP/VS); and submarines, SSN (DS), in direct support. As the war progresses, naval forces must be able to continue direct support operations but also wear down the enemy at sea through sustained attrition sea control operations. CVs, some of lesser capability for operations in the open sea lanes, escorts, VP/VS and SSN(DS) will also be required for both these direct support and attrition operations, plus additional SSNs, SOSUS and mines to establish and maintain attrition barriers. The high level of ~~vulnerability of the larger more costly platform~~ demand for these assets and the losses which can reasonably be expected in any all out war argue for large numbers.

Contrary to popular logic, extra-European demands on the U.S. Navy are not lesser included cases of the European one, but instead may be additive and of quite a different nature. Certainly sea control will be



*Is this a  
function  
of European  
theater or  
a conflict  
with  
USSR -  
if extra carrier  
conflict is  
with USSR  
(over Japan)  
air threat  
will be  
just as  
great.*

necessary if the navy is to be free to operate at all anywhere. The assets required will be similar to those for a European conflict, but with lesser emphasis on high performance carriers since the air threat environment will not be as hostile. These "other world" requirements may call for large numbers of ships if remote areas are to be covered without letting down our guard in Europe at the same time. Often the use of a supercarrier in the other world would represent many magnitudes of overkill and at the same time risk it unnecessarily to danger from the growing strength and ubiquity of coastal missile patrol boats. Small, less capable carriers would convey the same power message to other world nations, could be built in sufficient quantity to cover several trouble spots simultaneously, and when aggregated, could contribute meaningfully to any European scenario. Beyond a basic sea control requirement, it is more likely that projection forces will be needed in conflicts outside of Europe. In most other parts of the world (except for S. Korea) few in-place U.S. ground forces, no equipment stockpiles, and relatively less indigenous military support available calls for large numbers of insertion forces prepared to arrive on the scene quickly. This means having sufficient forces for remote contingency areas in advance of actual requirements. In short, these other world needs place greater requirements for numbers and somewhat lesser emphasis on high capability carriers:

The question then, given continually increasing ship costs, is how to obtain the large number of ships needed. The only reasonable answer seems to come from a very careful look at the capabilities required in the situations just described and the rejection of levels of ship flexibility/capability which exceed those needs. The aircraft carrier,

*\* off CVN numbers need to be halved, numbers are good for VSS.*

being the most flexible and consequently the most expensive system the navy owns, is unquestionably the first object for scrutiny. Recent debate has focused on whether to buy more CVNs or to shift to smaller CVs (<sup>VSS</sup>CVV). The principal threat to naval forces and their ability to establish sea control today is from missiles. Our sensors must reach farther out to detect and our range of weapon response must be greater and quicker. Aircraft are ideal, and in many cases unique, for both purposes. Thus sea based air power is vital to sea control today and growing more so. What choice is there then? At present budget levels, roughly one CVN can be funded every other year or two <sup>VSS</sup>CVV every year.

This would provide a force level increment in 10 years of 5 CVN or 20 <sup>VSS</sup>CVV added to the 11-12 CV/ CVN in the USN's programmed inventory through 2000. <sup>[ONE CVV]</sup> <sup>10</sup>

There are several risks with the CVN alternative: (1) With PGM's, etc., CV/ CVN's may become so vulnerable that we might be reluctant to commit them except in a big war. We might not want to run the risk of losing them in minor actions and then not have them for a crucial war. This was Great Britain's prudent inhibition in 1935 when considering intervention in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia; (2) There might not be adequate CVNs to cover either prolonged attrition operations in a large scale European and "other world" tasks.

There are risks with the CVV program as well: (1) The CVV carries fewer attack aircraft because of reduced demand in the sea control role; and (2) the CVV can accommodate fewer sophisticated aircraft. The reduced inventory of attack aircraft means that the CVV would be unable to field sufficient projection power for sustained air combat such as we conducted in Vietnam. One consequence of going to the CVV then would be that the USN might <sup>need to</sup> turn over sustained projection operations to the Air Force whose mobility has improved. The USN would thereby not need

*\* FY77  
CV - \$1.9B  
CVV - \$1.9B  
VSS - \$1.5B  
OK*

*Dangerous -  
don't think  
it should be  
said. OK  
concluded  
definitely*

to prepare for the unacceptable material strain of 8 years sustained combat operations such as in Vietnam, but instead could capitalize on both the CV and CVV's unique potential for early arrival without the need for prepared airfields. In the short run of course a large number of CVV could always be aggregated to provide a greater quantity of power projection.

Another consequence of reduced sophistication would be the risk that the CVV in the projection role could not field aircraft capable of countering modern air defenses even in the Third World or, in the sea control role of countering Soviet missile ships. For the immediate future, these weaknesses are mitigated by the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) which will enable retention of 11-12 CV/CVN's through the year 2000. If each CV/CVN were augmented by one or more CVV each CV/CVN could embark more VA/VF, leaving the ASW function to the CVV - increasing the CVN's attack capability. Further, until the success of VSTOL technology is more evident, two catapults (not necessarily steam) and arresting wires could be put on early CVV's.

The proposed aircraft carrier program, then would be to:

- Hold with 11-12 CV/CVN's and Air Wings.
- Rapidly move into the CVV with a trade off of at least <sup>2:1</sup> ~~4:1~~ for a CVN.
- Continue the accent on VSTOL/RPV technology.
- Hedge VSTOL/RPV bet with catapults/arresting gear on CVV.
- Add to enemy reconnaissance problems and reduce construction costs by proliferating common hull/propulsion for CVV, AD, AS, AO, AE, AF and LX?

→ LX is LSO  
common propulsion but not  
hull.

An operational concept would provide for:

- CVV and CV's employed in presence role with CVN's as the quick reaction "fire brigade". *⇒ ? don't deploy CVN's ?*
- Employ combination of CV/CVN and VSS for direct support sea control in areas of high air threat and for any projection of tactical air power; elsewhere CVV would assume bulk of sea control role. *Build both VSS & CVV's ?*

Numbers is equally the issue with other surface ships for sea control. Surface ship hull size is not costly, thus a common hull and propulsion system (non-nuclear) should be used for surface combatants like DD's, FF's and CG's. This would provide savings in the commonality of design, production and training, plus the advantages of proliferation. Costs must be brought down if numbers are to go up. In FY-1977, \$6.2B in SCN is buying 15 ~~1/6th~~ new ships; over time this rate of building will sustain a navy of only 330-380 ships, well less than today's navy. It is doubtful that a navy of this size would be adequate either for our attrition sea control requirements in Europe or our presence/reaction requirements in the "Other World."

SSN's are primarily an attrition weapon. Though direct support (escort) is a newer function with great potential, destroyers (DD) with towed arrays are less expensive than submarines and may prove to be as effective in the direct support function. Until the comparative usefulness of SSN (DS) and DD (towed array) is sorted out, the SSN building program should be slowed from the present 3-4 a year to 1 or none. There would be no harm in this for at least 3-4 years, because there is such a backlog of submarines on order already that a hiatus in funding would not impact on actual construction. In addition, we need time to assess what impact the present severe personnel problems in the nuclear submarine program will have on the submarine force level.

The Amphibious Force will find its role primarily in "Other World" requirements where their peacetime presence role could be useful and where smaller scale assaults are most likely. When it becomes necessary to replace amphibious ships, they should share a common hull with the CVV. *(Will Deck?)*

Greater numbers of underway replenishment ships will be needed to sustain "Other World" operations, especially as overseas bases decline in number. Like amphibious ships, they should also share a common hull with the CVV.

V

A navy with greater numbers of less sophisticated units combined with extant forces, will permit increased flexibility in deployments, a wider spread of assets, an improvement in response time to world events, and better (i.e. more carefully orchestrated) use of specialized forces like the Marines.

New employment possibilities include:

- ° Utilizing LPH's and LHA's as small CV's to create more deployed carrier task forces to increase naval presence around the world. In most parts of the world, a CVN task force is overkill.
- ° Increasing the flexibility of amphibious deployments by reducing size of 6th and 7th Fleet deployments, and interspersing them with irregular/varied deployments with small task forces to other parts of the world.

*Spends too much time away  
from home?*

- Changing CV balance: 7 in Atlantic (2 deployed), 5 in Pacific (2 deployed) in order to concentrate limited assets where biggest war is most likely and peacetime presence impact is most important.
- Homeport one Atlantic CV in U.K. for ready use in North Atlantic and rapid surge incursions in Mediterranean.
- Average 2 CV's for NATO use, but pulse up to 4-5 with U.K. homeported CV and Atlantic assets, and down to zero with LHA's as temporary substitutes.

The continued interest of the United States in the world around it will increase rather than decrease the need for naval power. This need cannot be met by a few very high quality ships nor by trying to operate with fewer ships but in much the same way we have since World War II. First, to cover the wide geographical range of national interests, there is no substitute for adequate numbers of ships. Adequate numbers do not now exist. Second, those ships must be used imaginatively. Repetition dulls the senses. Stereotype deployments continually convey less and less real meaning. Varied deployments can satisfactorily meet constant national commitments and at the same time respond more sensitively to changing world events. Only when these two requirements are met will the United States Navy be ready to meet the uncertainties of tomorrow.

**STAT**

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SUBJECT:		Comments on Admiral's article in Foreign Affairs and forwards the Winter Edition of the Review plus copy of "The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski"		
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OCINC FORM #2 (REV. 9/76)

OFFICE OF THE EDITOR



U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, R. I. 02840

14 January 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN  
Commander in Chief,  
Allied Forces Southern Europe  
Box 1, Fleet Post Office  
New York, 09524

Dear Admiral,

Before I could comment in writing on your recent article in Foreign Affairs I received your letter of 30 December with a copy of Williamson Murray's speech. Many thanks for sending it on for our consideration. I have read it with a great deal of interest and I appreciate you thinking of the Review.

Your article is a solid contribution to understanding the difficult and complex issues involved in comparing the U.S. Navy with that of the Soviet Union. It is a welcome antidote to the statements of those who play the numbers game.

In order to evaluate the naval balance between the Soviet Union and the United States it is necessary to address two separate but related questions. The first is what each nation requires of its naval forces. You covered this point well. The second is what I call the theory or concept of naval warfare. My comments are specifically directed to this latter question.

During my tenure here at the Naval War College I have devoted a great deal of time and effort to the study of this important, but, alas, neglected topic. The authorities can be listed almost on the fingers of one hand : Mahan, Corbett, Rosinski and to a lesser extent Castex and Richmond. One result of this intensive study has been my The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, which will be published by the NAval War College later this year. I am enclosing a copy of my introduction, which will provide amplification of what follows.



The classic theory or concept of naval warfare has been derived from a close examination of history and it was expounded at length, with varying degrees of clarity by Mahan and Corbett. At root it rests on the proposition that war at sea is clearly distinguished from war on land because the sea is one, to use Corbett's phrase. Because the sea is one, a naval force enjoys mobility and thus can move easily from one point on the ocean to another. The only thing that can prevent its movement is a superior naval force. Hence Mahan's conclusions about concentration, the battle line and so forth. This aspect of the classic concept is so familiar that it has become platitudinous, if not trite. Still, the implications are profound.

The objective of a superior naval force at sea is not to control a specific area of the sea ( as an army's objective is to control specific real estate), but rather to control the opponent. This is done either by destroying him in battle (Quiberon Bay, the Nile, Tsushima) or by preventing him from getting there in the first place ( close or distant blockade). This element of control is crucial and this concept was Rosinski's contribution.

All of this is a necessary prologue to show why I think you slighted the concept or theory of naval warfare in section VII of your article. Of course it is true that "if one can avoid meeting the enemy and thereby go on to carry out the mission, one has retained freedom to use the seas." But this misses the point that because the sea is one and as a result of mobility naval forces can be moved quickly and easily from one portion of the sea to another, the primary object of naval strategy is to destroy or to neutralize the enemy forces, which alone can prevent or frustrate carrying out "the mission." If one does not achieve this object of naval strategy - establishing control over an enemy - and instead proceeds to carry out "the mission" (whatever that may be), there is a great danger of committing the ulterior object fallacy. On this point Mahan very properly castigates the 18th century French Navy. It is something that we should not forget, if we are to avoid the same fate the French Navy experienced.

In this same section you say that "sea denial is essentially guerrilla warfare at sea." I see the point that you are trying to make, but the analogy does not generally hold. I think it was General Andre Beaufre who pointed out that the chief characteristic of guerrilla warfare is that the guerrilla has limited resources, but an unlimited freedom of movement in the theater. The same does not necessarily hold for an

Wrong.  
This assumes  
engagement of  
the enemy is  
a requisite for  
success / deny?  
No. the primary  
obj. of naval  
strategy is to  
prevent successful  
accomplishment  
of the mission  
getting there  
may only be  
chief of it.

characteristic  
perhaps, but not  
requisite

inferior naval force, unless of course one wishes to argue for an expanded guerre de course as a form of sea denial. However, I do not think you intended to go so far. The experience of World War I in which the German High Seas Fleet seldom ventured out of safe harbor does not bear out the guerrilla war analogy.

Corbett makes a very apt point when he discusses how command of the sea can be challenged, or in modern terminology how sea denial can be prosecuted. He bases his concept of the "fleet in being" on sound historical experience in which inferior naval forces refused contact with superior forces, but were able to and did engage detached portions of superior forces on roughly equal terms. So long as a "fleet in being" remains afloat and active, it is a threat which the superior naval force must consider in whatever it does. ( On this point Mahan criticizes de Grasse for not engaging a detached portion of the superior British fleet when he could, Subsequently de Grasse came to grief when both portions of the British fleet joined up. In the ensuing engagement the Ville de Paris was sunk and de Grasse himself was made a prisoner.)

In discussing the presence and sea control missions, a fundamental distinction must be made clear: presence is a peace time mission, in which shooting at our maritime enemy is strictly forbidden. Sea control, however, is a strictly wartime mission which can only be accomplished by shooting at him or by threatening to do so. The purpose of presence is to produce a desired effect simply by having naval forces in a given place at a specified time. The purpose of sea control is to control an enemy either by destroying him or by preventing him from going to sea in order to produce to a given effect.

I think it is fair to say that we as a profession have not paid enough attention to the experience of our forbears and to the excellent work of a few, but really remarkable writers. Luce was right: there is a "science of naval warfare" in so far that there is a body of knowledge and a methodology peculiar to this profession. Unfortunately, we have let people from other professions usurp the intellectual ( as opposed to the purely technical) aspect of the naval profession. I am sure you have heard me on this subject in the past, and I know others around the War College have heard me sound off more recently.

It is too bad the editors of Foreign Affairs decided to publish Michael Krepon's sophomoric article, which contained not only bad history, but it was also poorly organized. (Had he submitted it to the Review, I would have insisted on a

Not exactly  
- as threatening  
his objective of  
denying you.

also  
presence!


thorough re-write.) His thesis that the Navy must decide whether projection or sea control is its primary mission is reasonable, but it got lost in his verbiage. It also shows that he is simply not qualified to comment on this subject. Alas, I fear his article is unfortunately typical of much that is written by people who should know better, but do not.

In a more personal vein, I appreciate your comments about the Review. It is always a pleasure to receive kind words from our readers. Like every other job I have had in the Navy, this one is fun. However, I learned informally that the BUPERS computer will tell me soon that I must retire this summer. With this forewarning, I am busily looking around at whatever possibilities may exist. Wilma and I would like nothing better than to stay in Newport and I would like nothing better than to return to the Naval War College after the obligatory six month hiatus. However, that will depend on a number of factors, not the least of which will be Vice Admiral LeBourgeois' decision when he returns in March. From my experience I have observed that as a rule what the President of the Naval War College wants, he gets. Happily the President came through his operation Monday with flying colors.

It seems almost unbelievable that the Rutgers University Press has finally committed itself to publish that collection of essays and lectures from the Naval War College, which we discussed in your office in 1973. The book will be entitled War, Strategy and Maritime Power and they have promised me it will be published this spring. I will believe it when I see it.

Wilma joins me in sending our very best wishes to you and to Mrs. Turner.

Very respectfully,

  
B. M. Simpson, III  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy  
Editor

Enclosure

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE  
MEMO SLIP

FROM Cde T Date 23 Jan 77  
TO Adm T

Blueprint

1. Enclosed are staff comments which I thought you'd want to send in to to.
  2. I've marked "OK" in margin when I've incorporated a suggestion in the copy clipped to L side of folder.
  3. Have not incorporated Bobbie's comments, as to do right, would involve total rewrite. Personally feel it would throw paper too heavily to poli-sci, to detriment of technology section.
- Marty of Charlie Place's comments are conceptual + latent idea returned.*  
VR George

Next 11 Page(s) In Document Exempt

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE  
MEMO SLIP

FROM CAPT PETREE Date 18 Jan 77  
TO ADM TURNER

I appreciated the opportunity to review your "Blue-Print for the US Navy, 1976-2000." I found the concept paper personally stimulating. Further I was gratified personally, by finding (among the many innovative ideas which you expressed) a few ideas which are reflected in my personal thoughts of the past few years.

In addition to marginal notes on the copy provided, my review of the concept paper resulted in the attached questions and criticisms.

Should your personal schedule permit, following your study of the comments which your AFSOUTH Navy officers have submitted, I recommend a panel discussion with you, for you to hear an expansion (or defense) of our ideas, and for us to hear your reaction to our comments.

Very respectfully,  
Paul H. Helmer

Yes -  
George Amnell



1. POLITICAL IMPERATIVES. Although I concur that the second vital interest of the United States is our relationship with Western Europe, and that the requirements for control of sealines of communications (SEALOC) between US and Europe should predominate those of the US Navy for projection of maritime power ashore, I would tend to earmark the remaining naval resources for shoring up our hemispheric alliance and improving the mutual maritime defense capabilities of North and South America. Many of the hemispheric allies have close ties with Europe, which would become matters of concern for them if our SEALOC with Europe were threatened. I believe that we have been missing a great opportunity for combined training and readiness with these allies.

2. TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS.

a. In addition to the few-expensive-versus-many-less-expensive-ships consideration will be that of how we are going to man our mix of fighting ships. If this is not considered as we conceive a naval force structure for the foreseeable future, we are:

(1) Excluding human engineering, training and manning from our force structure planning (for which the Navy's leaders in Washington recently have taken some gaff) and,

(2) We are overlooking plans for over fifty percent (OPN) of our naval expenditures between now and the year 2000.

b. Assuming that the all-volunteer or another scheme can provide the manpower to man whatever ships we decide to build, and that today's technology can design ships and mission-functional systems either to be man-intensive or machine-intensive, we must consider some of the things with which our nuclear submarine force is wrestling, e.g., morale/professionalism/retention/leadership and the ship that spends long periods at sea and out of home port. The merchant marine is having increasing problems keeping men at sea; as a result, they are designing multi-hundred thousand-ton carriers to be manned and operated by two or three dozen men, and are replacing them midway in the voyage. To summarize my question, do we design our ships for minimal manning with many centralized control and automatic features, as well as with numerous crew comfort and recreation features? Or, do we simplify mission-functional systems, machinery and crew support facilities? These and other questions relating to seagoing manpower must be answered as we design our Navy out to year 2000.

3. In page 6, second paragraph, line 11, sentence beginning with: "The larger, the more expensive....", another criterion of a high value target is its value to the objective of the force, which may not pertain to a large and/or expensive ship.

4. In page 7, para 2, line 21 (Sentence beginning with "It may be so difficult....") to end of paragraph, the clarity of thought is diffused and the conclusion is not clear.

5. CONCEPT FOR THE US NAVY. In page 9, para 1, line 4 (sentence beginning with: "These "other world" requirements.....") I do not believe that US public opinion will support the rationale that the Navy requires a large number of ships in order to support US interventions in many areas of the world; this is opposed to a more popular rationale that a large navy is required to support a war in Europe (requiring X-number ships) and a half-war in Asia (requiring another specified number of ships). Until year 2000 I believe that the generation of US Viet Nam veterans will be very sensitive to, and negative toward, involvements with US military forces anywhere but in Europe, North and Central America and some clear-cut crisis in Asia (such as the 1976 "tree-trimming" murders of US personnel in Korea).

? 6. In page 10, para 3, first CVV risk, I believe that clause should end with: "....reduced demand in the power projection role." As I understand it, the CVV aircraft are assigned especially for a sea control role.

OK 7. In page 11, para 3, second line, recommend that this line be changed to read, "...hold with 11-12 CV/CVNs and Navy Air Wings, augmented or replaced by Marine Air Wings." The marines served in this role in Viet Nam and likewise should be assigned in the foreseeable future.

8. In pages 13 and 14, as new employment possibilities, I strongly support varying the amphibious and CV deployments. For 20 years we have been locked into the fixed-force-level deployments to Asia and Europe; and, during that period, we have paid dearly in O&M economies and political-military flexibility by doggedly adhering to that policy. At times we have been unable to "pulse" and unable to show the flag, except at great expense and disruption to ship readiness programs and personnel stability.



COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE


NAVY EYES ONLY

13 JAN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: CAPTAIN DEHART  
CAPT BIRD  
CAPT PETREE  
CDR PEASE

Subj: Blueprint for the USN, 1976 - 2000

1. Request your comments on the attached draft, "Blueprint for the USN, 1976 - 2000." I am primarily interested in your impressions regarding the validity of my arguments, persuasiveness of the case as presented, weak spots, factual/conceptual errors, and any ideas for strengthening the paper.
2. Please furnish your comments no later than Wednesday, 19 January, to Commander Thibault for coordination and consolidation.

  
STANSFIELD TURNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Enclosure:

(1) Draft Paper, "Blueprint for the USN, 1976 - 2000" dtd 11 Jan 1977

NAVY EYES ONLY

BLUEPRINT FOR THE USN

1976 - 2000

I

In recent months there has been considerable debate in both the Executive and Legislative branches on how best to spend the most generous allowance of monies for shipbuilding which the Congress has appropriated since World War II. The fact that there was so much debate has underscored the uncertainty in government as to what the U.S. Navy will be expected to do in coming decades. This paper briefly examines the major considerations in predicting the future role of the navy and suggests a shipbuilding program which will ensure that the Navy's role can be fulfilled.

Two factors are predominant in determining those tasks which the Navy may be called upon to perform and which it will be capable of performing:

- (1) The politico-military environment in which the United States and her allies must function, and
- (2) the technological advances which inexorably alter the conduct of warfare.

II

Politico-Military Environment

The first characteristic of the politico-military environment is strategic nuclear balance. Naval contributions to U.S. strategic nuclear forces will continue to demand the highest priority. Since the naval strategic program is a part of a tri-service force, limited by international agreement, and customarily considered separately from other naval shipbuilding programs, it will not be considered in detail in this paper.

The second political imperative is to maintain the traditional close relationship between the United States and Western Europe. Militarily, the defense of Western Europe must rank next among the United States' concerns. While most thinking on the Navy's role in Europe foresees a continued need for both naval projection of power ashore and for sea control, it is popularly contended that sea control would not be important in a NATO conflict because any war with the Soviets in Europe would be short and therefore resupply unnecessary. We must recall with concern that a short war was also predicted in both 1914 and 1939. Those contentions were wrong. However, even in a short war, some critical goods must start flowing very early, particularly if inadequate war supplies are stockpiled as is the case today in Europe. In any major NATO conflict, sea control requirements would dominate those of projection, also because neither naval tactical air nor amphibious projection figure prominently in NATO's concept for the defense of Europe. Unless it is perceived that the U.S. Navy continues to be capable of waging an effective sea control campaign in a long war against growing Soviet naval strength, our allies may understandably question the credibility of our capability to support them. Even worse, the Soviet Union might perceive the naval balance as being sufficiently in their favor to permit them to risk testing us at sea.

In sum, for support of NATO and Europe, the U.S. Navy must be prepared

- ° To employ such projection assets as it has, but not necessarily to program specifically for that purpose;

- To conduct successful sea control operations by direct support of naval forces and limited convoys in a short war;
- To conduct successful sustained sea control operations in a long war by means of both direct support of specific resupply and reinforcement shipping and by progressive attrition operations to wear down the overall enemy threat over time.
- To foster the perception that we possess the capability to achieve a requisite level of sea control over both the long and short term.

A third demand of the political environment will be to safeguard United State's interests in parts of the world outside Europe. The probability that the United States will need to use military force in support of foreign policy is increasing, particularly in the developing nations. In many newly independent nations, the rapidly evolving national political structure and growing economic aspirations often lack adequate economic underpinnings. In such circumstances, the shift from colonial control to national independence can result in economic and political commitments which in themselves constitute a new form of dependence. Such dependence may seem antithetical to nationalist objectives and can create regional turmoil. When the virtually unique circumstances surrounding each emerging nation's quest for a place in the sun is combined with the heightened potential for interference debouched by OPEC wealth, the current vogue for terrorism, and the activities of new regional pressure blocs in the United Nations, being ready to support our foreign interests militarily appears prudent. Such interests include:

- Ensuring access to raw materials,
- Protecting special interests in Central and South America,
- Preventing regional power balance disturbances in areas like the Middle East and Asia from upsetting the global balance of power.

- Supporting concerns for human rights, democracy, freedom of seas, suppression of terrorism, etc.
- Protecting our economic activities on the high seas.

In addition, in considering the politico-military environment in the non-European world, we can not overlook the evidence of Soviet ambition to wield global influence. In fact the Soviet economic base is inadequate to this aspiration, as is its diplomatic competence, e.g., Soviet setback in Egypt. However, the Soviets are not going to be denied a global military capability through their expanding military airlift capacity, merchant marine and naval forces. It will be in our interests to be prepared to manage this military component of Soviet global policy. Not to do so, and it is much more within our capability than theirs to wield global military power, would simply assist their overcoming their economic and diplomatic weaknesses to our detriment. Moreover, while our defense posture in Europe is of higher consequence to us than that anywhere else, the probability of the Soviets initiating military hostilities against NATO are low. Their estimate of our readiness to respond elsewhere will be a major determinant of how aggressively they act, with consequent danger of our being forced into an unwanted confrontation.

To support its non-European interests, the United States must be able to move power quickly to areas of concern. If both superpowers become directly involved in the same political event, the first to arrive on the scene with military force may preclude the other from bringing force to bear lest there be a direct confrontation over an issue that is less than vital to either. For instance, if the Lebanon crisis of 1958 were re-enacted today, whichever went ashore first, the

U.S. or Soviet Marines, would likely be the only ones to go ashore. Being there first means either possessing large numbers of units that can be present in many places simultaneously, or having highly mobile units that can respond rapidly. In either case, the navy has the special potential for access, for remaining on-station and for projecting graduated power. That power may be either the capability to exercise sea control through a blockade or by breaking a blockade; or it may be the ability to project power from the sea to the shore with tactical air strikes, amphibious assault, gunfire or aerial reconnaissance. In short, for non-European applications of naval power, large numbers of ships for both sea control and power projection are needed. How much of which ship types will be needed is in large part a function of what technology will permit in the decades ahead.

### III

#### Technological Trends

The major technological issue in the sea control task is whether the vulnerability of surface ships decreases by having large numbers of smaller, less capable, less expensive ships or small numbers of larger, very capable, expensive ships. Two fundamental facts incline the argument toward larger numbers of modestly capable ships. First, a ship's ability to defend itself does not generally improve in proportion to increasing size and cost. There are exceptions, of course, where a specific capability which can be incorporated in a larger ship could



not have been physically accommodated in a smaller one. However, many technological trends are making this kind of limitation less likely because greater miniaturization of equipment, particularly when combined with greater individual weapon accuracy, permits ships to be smaller, lighter, and cheaper. One exception is the technology of nuclear power. The fact that nuclear power technology has not decreased in cost demands that this highly desirable form of naval propulsion be carefully weighed against the number of conventionally powered units which could be bought with the same money.

Second, developments like Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), nuclear-powered submarines, anti-ship missiles, and satellites tend to favor the sea denial role more than the sea control role. A sea control war of attrition will entail losses for which only replacements will restore the balance. If nuclear weapons are employed at sea, sea denial forces would have an even greater advantage in their favor and the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea is becoming more rather than less probable. The increase in the probability that a single weapon will kill because it is nuclear, or even precision-guided, tends to make a "surgical" strike more easily possible. This, in turn, lowers the threshold at which such a weapon will be used. The larger, the more expensive, the more irreplaceable a ship is, the more it represents a "must" target. If the enemy feels capable of eliminating a large segment of our military prestige and power individually, perhaps to make an isolated foreign policy point, the more he is encouraged to do so by crossing the nuclear threshold in a single, closely contained action -- perhaps at sea only. No single ship can be so important either as a

fraction of a nation's military strength or as an object of that nation's prestige that it cannot be lost without irreparably damaging either. Today's technology is making numbers more important than ever.

The technological issue for tactical air projection turns on a similar conundrum. Will fewer, less costly platforms (missiles, or Remotely-Piloted Vehicles [RPVs] or lesser performance manned aircraft with Precision Guided Munitions [PGMs]) enable us to meet our future projection needs, or will we still have to depend on large numbers of expensive, high performance, manned aircraft? Technology is tending to the former. Though microelectronics and the miniaturization of immense computational memory power, the capability to control aircraft and weapons is greatly enhanced. This has permitted the development of weapons with very high probabilities of direct hit (Precision Guided Munitions [PGMs]). The more accurate the weapon, the fewer need to be carried, the smaller and fewer the aircraft. If the aircraft can also be remotely controlled with great accuracy, the more missions it can accomplish without a pilot. Naturally there is a large middle ground where it is difficult to determine the degree to which unmanned aircraft will encroach on manned. Missions like armed RECCE will probably require human intelligence in a cockpit for some time to come. And, technological developments seldom have one-sided application. Enhanced computational capability will increase air defense effectiveness making penetration more difficult, ECM/ECCM a greater determinant of success; and the cost of both greater. It may be so difficult for a lesser performance aircraft to penetrate air defenses, that large numbers of higher performance attack aircraft may be required for escort, ECM, defense suppression, air superiority, etc. In such an event, however, we probably would be forced to rely more heavily on technology, turning to less vulnerable and less costly attack systems, e.g. unmanned RPVs and cruise missiles, rather than brute force.

IV

Concept for the U.S. Navy

Taking into consideration the discernable politico-military trends in the European and "other world" arenas and the implications of technology on surface ships and aircraft in the next decade, the following is suggested as a concept for the United States Navy through the end of this century.

With primary emphasis on the defense of Europe, naval assets must first be capable of sea control in direct support of naval forces and immediate resupply shipping. They must withstand the initial preemptive onslaught and then quickly establish a level of sea control wherein they can afford to provide support to forces ashore or protection of resupply shipping within an acceptable level of risk to themselves. This will require high performance carriers (CV's) and escorts to operate in a high air threat environment; anti-submarine aircraft (VP/VS); and submarines, SSN (DS), in direct support. As the war progresses, naval forces must be able to continue direct support operations but also wear down the enemy at sea through sustained attrition sea control operations. CVs, some of lesser capability for operations in the open sea lanes, escorts, VP/VS and SSN(DS) will also be required for both these direct support and attrition operations, plus additional SSNs, SOSUS and mines to establish and maintain attrition barriers. The high level of demand for these assets and the losses which can reasonably be expected in any all out war argue for large numbers.

Contrary to popular logic, extra-European demands on the U.S. Navy are not lesser included cases of the European one, but instead may be additive and of quite a different nature. Certainly sea control will be

necessary if the navy is to be free to operate at all anywhere. The assets required will be similar to those for a European conflict, but with lesser emphasis on high performance carriers since the air threat environment will not be as hostile. These "other world" requirements may call for large numbers of ships if remote areas are to be covered without letting down our guard in Europe at the same time. Often the use of a supercarrier in the other world would represent many magnitudes of overkill and at the same time risk it unnecessarily to danger from the growing strength and ubiquity of coastal missile patrol boats. Small, less capable carriers would convey the same power message to other world nations, could be built in sufficient quantity to cover several trouble spots simultaneously, and when aggregated, could contribute meaningfully to any European scenario. Beyond a basic sea control requirement, it is more likely that projection forces will be needed in conflicts outside of Europe. In most other parts of the world (except for S. Korea) few in-place U.S. ground forces, no equipment stockpiles, and relatively less indigenous military support available calls for large numbers of insertion forces prepared to arrive on the scene quickly. This means having sufficient forces for remote contingency areas in advance of actual requirements. In short, these other world needs place greater requirements for numbers and somewhat lesser emphasis on high capability carriers.

The question then, given continually increasing ship costs, is how to obtain the large number of ships needed. The only reasonable answer seems to come from a very careful look at the capabilities required in the situations just described and the rejection of levels of ship flexibility/capability which exceed those needs. The aircraft carrier,

being the most flexible and consequently the most expensive system the navy owns, is unquestionably the first object for scrutiny. Recent debate has focused on whether to buy more CVNs or to shift to smaller CVs (CVV). The principal threat to naval forces and their ability to establish sea control today is from missiles. Our sensors must reach farther out to detect and our range of weapon response must be greater and quicker. Aircraft are ideal, and in many cases unique, for both purposes. Thus sea based air power is vital to sea control today and growing more so. What choice is there then? At present budget levels, roughly one CVN can be funded every other year or two CVV every year. This would provide a force level increment in 10 years of 5 CVN or 20 CVV added to the 11-12 CV/CVN in the USN's programmed inventory through 2000.

There are several risks with the CVN alternative: (1) With PGM's, etc., CV/CVN's may become so vulnerable that we might be reluctant to commit them except in a big war. We might not want to run the risk of losing them in minor actions and then not have them for a crucial war. This was Great Britain's prudent inhibition in 1935 when considering intervention in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia; (2) There might not be adequate CVNs to cover either prolonged attrition operations in a large scale European and "other world" tasks.

There are risks with the CVV program as well: (1) The CVV carries fewer attack aircraft because of reduced demand in the sea control role; and (2) the CVV can accommodate fewer sophisticated aircraft. The reduced inventory of attack aircraft means that the CVV would be unable to field sufficient projection power for sustained air combat such as we conducted in Vietnam. One consequence of going to the CVV then would be that the USN might turn over sustained projection operations to the Air Force whose mobility has improved. The USN would thereby not need

to prepare for the unacceptable material strain of 8 years sustained combat operations such as in Vietnam, but instead could capitalize on both the CV and CVV's unique potential for early arrival without the need for prepared airfields. In the short run of course a large number of CVV could always be aggregated to provide a greater quantity of power projection.

Another consequence of reduced sophistication would be the risk that the CVV in the projection role could not field aircraft capable of countering modern air defenses even in the Third World or, in the sea control role of countering Soviet missile ships. For the immediate future, these weaknesses are mitigated by the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) which will enable retention of 11-12 CV/CVN's through the year 2000. If each CV/CVN were augmented by one or more CVV each CV/CVN could embark more VA/VF, leaving the ASW function to the CVV - increasing the CVN's attack capability. Further, until the success of VSTOL technology is more evident, two catapults (not necessarily steam) and arresting wires could be put on early CVV's.

The proposed aircraft carrier program, then would be to:

- Hold with 11-12 CV/CVN's and Air Wings.
- Rapidly move into the CVV with a trade off of at least 4:1 for a CVN.
- Continue the accent on VSTOL/RPV technology.
- Hedge VSTOL/RPV bet with catapults/arresting gear on CVV.
- Add to enemy reconnaissance problems and reduce construction costs by proliferating common hull/propulsion for CVV, AD, AS, AO, AE, AF and LX.

*plus  
Marines*

An operational concept would provide for:

- ° CVV and CV's employed in presence role with CVN's as the quick reaction "fire brigade".
- ° Employ combination of CV/CVN and VSS for direct support sea control in areas of high air threat and for any projection of tactical air power; elsewhere CVV would assume bulk of sea control role.

Numbers is equally the issue with other surface ships for sea control. Surface ship hull size is not costly, thus a common hull and propulsion system (non-nuclear) should be used for surface combatants like DD's, FF's and CG's. This would provide savings in the commonality of design, production and training, plus the advantages of proliferation. Costs must be brought down if numbers are to go up. In FY-1977, \$6.2B in SCN is buying 15 1/6th new ships; over time this rate of building will sustain a navy of only 330-380 ships, well less than today's navy. It is doubtful that a navy of this size would be adequate either for our attrition sea control requirements in Europe or our presence/reaction requirements in the "Other World."

SSN's are primarily an attrition weapon. Though direct support (escort) is a newer function with great potential, destroyers (DD) with towed arrays are less expensive than submarines and may prove to be as effective in the direct support function. Until the comparative usefulness of SSN (DS) and DD (towed array) is sorted out, the SSN building program should be slowed from the present 3-4 a year to 1 or none. There would be no harm in this for at least 3-4 years, because there is such a backlog of submarines on order already that a hiatus in funding would not impact on actual construction. In addition, we need time to assess what impact the present severe personnel problems in the nuclear submarine program will have on the submarine force level.

The Amphibious Force will find its role primarily in "Other World" requirements where their peacetime presence role could be useful and where smaller scale assaults are most likely. When it becomes necessary to replace amphibious ships, they should share a common hull with the CVV.

Greater numbers of <sup>multi-delivery</sup> underway replenishment ships will be needed to sustain "Other World" operations, especially as overseas bases decline in number. Like amphibious ships, they should also share a common hull with the CVV.

*Common  
powerplant,  
yes, but  
common  
hull for  
amphibs?*

V

A navy with greater numbers of less sophisticated units combined with extant forces, will permit increased flexibility in deployments, a wider spread of assets, an improvement in response time to world events, and better (i.e. more carefully orchestrated) use of specialized forces like the Marines.

New employment possibilities include:

- ° Utilizing LPH's and LHA's as small CV's to create more deployed carrier task forces to increase naval presence around the world. In most parts of the world, a CVN task force is overkill.
- ° Increasing the flexibility of amphibious deployments by reducing size of 6th and 7th Fleet deployments, and interspersing them with irregular/varied deployments with small task forces to other parts of the world.

*Concur!*



- Changing CV balance: 7 in Atlantic (2 deployed), 5 in Pacific (2 deployed) in order to concentrate limited assets where biggest war is most likely and peacetime presence impact is most important.
- Homeport one Atlantic CV in U.K. for ready use in North Atlantic and rapid surge incursions in Mediterranean.
- Average 2 CV's for NATO use, but pulse up to 4-5 with U.K. homeported CV and Atlantic assets, and down to zero with LHA's as temporary substitutes.

*Sounds good, but  
we've been studying  
try homeporting  
before!  
Concern.*

The continued interest of the United States in the world around it will increase rather than decrease the need for naval power. This need cannot be met by a few very high quality ships nor by trying to operate with fewer ships but in much the same way we have since World War II. First, to cover the wide geographical range of national interests, there is no substitute for adequate numbers of ships. Adequate numbers do not now exist. Second, those ships must be used imaginatively. Repetition dulls the senses. Stereotype deployments continually convey less and less real meaning. Varied deployments can satisfactorily meet constant national commitments and at the same time respond more sensitively to changing world events. Only when these two requirements are met will the United States Navy be ready to meet the uncertainties of tomorrow.

HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE

MEMO SLIP

FROM \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

TO \_\_\_\_\_

thoughts

Admiral  
Dec 19 Jan

I agree w/ "numbers" vice  
expensive highly capable —  
per se:

---

Am not sure we've made a  
persuasive case of how  
gun boat diplomacy really  
counts in 3<sup>rd</sup> world scenarios —  
Does it — based on what recent  
evidence?

---

Am not sure I'd cut SSN program

to buy small surface ships ... but OK

STAT

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE

NAVY EYES ONLY

13 JAN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: CAPTAIN DEHART  
CAPT BIRD  
CAPT PETREE  
CDR PEASE | 

7

Subj: Blueprint for the USN, 1976 - 2000

1. Request your comments on the attached draft, "Blueprint for the USN, 1976 - 2000." I am primarily interested in your impressions regarding the validity of my arguments, persuasiveness of the case as presented, weak spots, factual/conceptual errors, and any ideas for strengthening the paper.
2. Please furnish your comments no later than Wednesday, 19 January, to Commander Thibault for coordination and consolidation.

  
STANSFIELD TURNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Enclosure:

(1) Draft Paper, "Blueprint for the USN, 1976 - 2000" dtd 11 Jan 1977

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